Fractional Assessments--Do Our Courts Sanction Inequality by Tideman, Robert
Hastings Law Journal
Volume 16 | Issue 4 Article 4
1-1965
Fractional Assessments--Do Our Courts Sanction
Inequality
Robert Tideman
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Hastings Law Journal by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository.
Recommended Citation
Robert Tideman, Fractional Assessments--Do Our Courts Sanction Inequality, 16 Hastings L.J. 573 (1965).
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal/vol16/iss4/4
Fractional Assessments-Do Our Courts
Sanction Inequality?
By ROBERT TrEMAN*
AN IMPORTANT chapter in California's tax -history closed October
29, 1964, when the California Supreme Court denied petitions for
rehearing in two cases1 involving the constitutional mandate that "All
property subject to taxation shall be assessed for taxation at its full
cash value."2 In both cases plaintiffs sought writs of mandate enforcing
the constitutional command.
Two months before, the district court of appeal had refused to issue
the writs, declaring that fractional valuations had been employed
widely and long with court approval.3 The decision by Justice Lime
was cautiously worded. At no point did it call fractional assessments
constitutional. Nor did it even venture to call them "not unconstitu-
tional." Its strongest words were:
In the face of the many decisions in this state herein referred to,
we cannot say that the administrative construction resulting in the
assessment of taxable property by a county at a uniform fraction of
its full cash value is "erroneous or unauthorized."4
In a striking display of verbal virtuosity the decision found twelve
ways to say that the courts knew about fractional assessments for
seventy-five years but never struck them down.5 The court also admit-
ted that the validity of fractional assessments had not been at issue
in any of the cases cited. The court did not lay down the precise quota
of dicta requisite for repeal of a constitutional mandate, but its deci-
sion could become a useful precedent for settling that knotty question.
* Executive Secretary, Northern California Extension, Henry George School of
Social Science.
1Michels v. Watson, 229 A.C.A. 497, 40 Cal. Rptr. 464 (1964), and Hanks v.
State Bd. of Equalization, 229 A.C.A. 520, 40 Cal. Rptr. 478 (1964).
2 CAL. CoNsT. art. XI, § 12.
3 Michels v. Watson, 229 A.C.A. 497, 40 Cal. Rptr. 464 (1964); Hanks v. State
Bd. of Equalization, 229 A.C.A. 520, 40 Cal. Rptr. 478 (1964).
4 Michels v. Watson, 229 A.C.A. 497, 502, 40 Cal. Rptr. 464, 467 (1964).
5 Id. at 502-08, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 467-70 (recognized, recited, indicated, referred to,
permitted, accepted, approved, acknowledged, described, relied upon, was aware, did
not question).
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In a single dissent covering both cases, Justice Fourt took an un-
complicated view of the law:
It is Hornbook law that the provisions of the Constitution are
mandatory ....
Nowhere is it indicated that the assessor need not comply with
the provisions of the Constitution and the statutes ....
The meaning of "full cash value" has been determined by both
legislative and judicial fiat. It has been held that "full cash value"
is synonymous with "market value."...
The majority in this particular case in effect hold that the long
continued, systematic and intentional violation of the law somehow
constitutes or has developed into a right in the assessor to violate the
specific provisions of the law....
No amount of juggling, subterfuge, circumventions, evasions, de-
ception, maneuvering, legalistic legerdemain or sorcery can change
the plain and specific provisions of the Constitution....
... [P]laintiff and many others in his position have suffered and
do now suffer a detriment because of fractional assessing ....6
Those who share Justice Fourt's straightforward view of the law
may be puzzled by the decision. Could there be extralegal considera-
tions, not clearly visible, yet powerful enough to weigh in the balance?
That there could be, indeed, is suggested by the indictment recently
leveled by the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations:
. .. [F]ew officials feel under obligation to enforce the tax laws as
written. In some states, in fact, compliance by the assessors with the
constitution and statutes would cause general consternation.7 The
average assessor makes himself a sort of one-man legislature. He-
not the state constitution and the state legislature-defines local
taxing and borrowing power and determines the value of a veterans'
or homestead tax exemption by the level at which he decides to
assess property.8
The consternation that would swirl about their heads if assessors
obeyed the law voluntarily might well ruffle the court that compelled
them to do so.
6Id. at 509-14, 40 Cal. Rptr. 472-74 (dissenting opinion).
V"Special consternation " would be a more fitting term in view of the interests that
would be offended (author's comment).
8 1 U.S. ADVISORY CONI'N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, THE ROLF OF THE
STATES ix STENGTHENTr, THm mIrvTy TAx 4 (1963). (Emphasis added.)
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Why there should be consternation over a rise in the level of assess-
ment puzzles some students of taxation. Superficially, the assessment
level seems unimportant. Lower valuations simply compel higher tax
rates. Tax bills, being the product of valuation and rate, seem un-
affected. That more remains to be said should be suspected from the
widespread practice of illegal underassessment. If the level makes no
difference, overassessment should be as common as underassessment.
A universal bias in one direction suggests anything but indifference.
It is easy to suppose that low assessment levels are only a side-effect
of inflation, that assessors just cannot keep up with the inflationary rise
of property values. The supposition is effectively countered, however,
by the seventy-five years of fractional assessing cited by Justice Lillie.
In good times and bad, through inflation and deflation, fractional as-
sessments have held their steady career.
A 'long continued, systematic and intentional violation of the
law" °0 is no accident. Its explanation lies in the interests it serves.
What blocs are benefitted by fractional assessing? What interests stand
in the shade of this ungainly plant that it should survive three-fourths
of a century and subvert at last the constitution that stood in its way?
These are the questions that must be asked and answered if under-
assessment is to be clearly understood. That they are seldom raised
indicates not their irrelevance but the exact opposite. Crucial questions
are often the most awkward to ask or answer.
The Motives for Undervaluation
One explanation is that, consciously or unconsciously, assessors
undervalue to minimize complaints. Bird explains the mechanics:
The taxpayer whose property is assessed at, say, 40 per cent of
full value when the law specifies 100 per cent may think that he has
a bargain; even if much other property is assessed at only 25 per cent
or 30 per cent, usually he is not in a position to know this; and even if
he feels discriminated against he is unlikely to complain when he
realizes that his assessment potential is more than twice the existing
level."
But the self-interest of assessors alone cannot account for the
extent and universality of fractional assessing. The supposed cause is
too small to produce the known effect. Not only is the assessor but one
) 229 A.C.A. at 500 nn.1 & 2, 502 nn.3 & 4, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 465 n.1, 466 n.2,
467 nn.3 & 4 (dissenting opinion).
10 Id. at 511, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 473 (dissenting opinion).
11 F. BmD, THE GENmiAL PnoPErTn TAx: Fin~mcns OF THE 1957 CENSUS OF GOV-
muars 32 (1960).
May, 1965] FRACTIONAL ASSESSMENTS
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
official against a mass of taxpayers who elect him, but tax valuations
continue, to drop far below the levels that effectively discourage
protests. Other potent forces are clearly at work.
One pressure group benefitted by fractional assessment is the
veterans. The veterans' exemption shaves 1,000 dollars from the tax-
able value of a veteran's property if its total assessed value is less
than 5,000 dollars."" Thus a veteran owning a 20,000 dollar home,
ineligible for exemption if the home were assessed at anything like
full cash value, can slip under the wire with a -twenty-three per cent
assessment of 4,600 dollars. Also, the lower the assessment level, the
greater the tax saving effected by reducing a veteran's assessment
1,000 dollars. But, again, the history of fractional assessment contradicts
the notion that veterans are its prime beneficiaries. The practice was
old when veterans began to cash in on it.
Recipients of welfare aid also benefit from fractional assessment,
for it enables them to hold more property, yet stay eligible for as-
sistance. 2 But few will suppose that welfare recipients or the welfare
bureaucracy have had enough political muscle to account for the prac-
tice.
Assessment of property at levels well below the required "full cash
value" began in days when the State itself levied a property tax.13
The statewide rate was added to county tax bills. At that time no one
was puzzled over why a county assessor trimmed his assessed valua-
tions. He did it to shift the burden of the State tax from his own constit-
uents to property taxpayers in other counties or to defend his con-
stituents from similar shifts by other county assessors. Such competitive
underassessment led to creation of the State Board of Equalization
and gave it its name. To equalize the burden of the statewide tax
rate, the Board was empowered to raise or lower the entire assess-
ment roll in any county.' 4 No statewide property tax has been levied
since 1914; but, whenever a taxing district crosses county lines, the
same motive for underassessment may be at work today.
The Riley-Stewart Plan of 1933 spawned another important motive
for undervaluation by county assessors.' Before 1933, privately owned
public utilities paid taxes to the State. After 1933, utility property was
h1a CAL. CONST. art. XIII, § 1/4.
12CAL. WELFARE & INS'NS CODE §§ 450-55, cited by Justice Fourt, 229 A.CA.
at 514-16, 40 Cal. Rptr. at 474-75 (dissenting opinion).13 CAL. SENATE I T Oium Comm. ON GOVEENMENTAL ORGANiZATION, EQUALIZATION
OF AD VALoRiEm TAX ASSESSMENTS IN CALuORNIA 12 (1957).
14 Id. at 12-13.
15 Id. at 18-19.
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assessed by the State but taxed on its assessed value by local govern-
ments at the regular local rates. This new arrangement opened the
way for county assessors to shift more of the tax burden to utilities
by setting their assessments at lower levels than those applied by the
State Board of Equalization to utility property. In recognition of the
unequal burden borne by utilities due to undervaluation by local
assessors, the Board of Equalization in 1935 ordered thirty-one
counties to raise their assessment levels, some by as much as eight-five
per cent; three more equalization orders followed in 1936 and three in
1937.16
Since 1945 the distribution of State aid to school districts has pre-
sented county assessors with another motive for competitive under-
assessment. The formulas for State aid to so-called needy districts are
tied to assessed valuations.' 7 By undervaluing, an assessor can enable
school districts in his county to show greater "need" and thereby get
more money from the State. Uniform apportionment of school aid is
one of the reasons for the equalization orders issued by the Board of
Equalization since 1955.18
A last and most important motive for fractional assessment arises
because of the tax and debt limits applying to local governments.
Limits have been imposed by the legislature on general-law cities,
school districts, and other taxing bodies; similar limits appear in the
charters of some chartered cities.'9 The limits are always expressed as
percentages of total assessed valuation. Every assessor in the State is
under severe pressure from a certain body of real estate owners to
assess as far as possible below the constitutional level in order to
constrict the power of local governments to tax their holdings. This
is the motive which drew sharp rebuke from the Advisory Commission
on Intergovernmental Relations: "He-not the state constitution and
the state legislature-defines local taxing and borrowing power .... 2 0
Illustrating the lengths to which this extralegal power can go,
10 ibid.
1 7 CAL. ASSEMBLY INTERIM Comm. ON REVENUtE AND TAXATION, TAXATION OF
PRoPEsRTY IN CALiFoP, 124 (1964).
18 CAL. SENATE INTERIM COMM. ON Go ENmEr.AL ORGANIZATiON, EQUALIZATION
OF AD VALOREM TAX ASSESSMENTS IN CALIFORNIA 38 (1957).
'9 The "Legislature shall have power . . . to limit the amount of taxes which
may be imposed upon real and personal property...." CAL. CONST. art. XI, § 20. For
a summary of the various statutory limits and the California Code sections, see CAL.
ASSEmBLY INTERIM Comm. ON REvENuE Am TAXATION, TAXATION OF PROPERTY IN
CALIFORNiA 354-57 (1964).
201 U.S. ADvsoRy CONMN ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, THE ROLE OF
THE STATES IN STRENGTHENING THE PROPERTY TAX 4 (1963).
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an assessor in a southern state admitted that he was "sitting tight" on
assessed values in a certain school district because he was personally
opposed to a new school and it could not be built so long as he kept
his valuations down.2 1 The thought is not confined to the Deep South.
In 1961 a top official of one of California's largest farm organizations
confidentially told the writer and a few others that he had had occasion
to congratulate most of the assessors in California for their part in
keeping down governmental extravagance. The writer asked if he
were not really congratulating them for violating their oaths of office.
"That," he gently replied, "is another way of putting it."
Undervaluation by county assessors does restrict local real estate
taxes. Yet this is a very different thing from restricting expenditure.
According to the report of the last Assembly Interim Committee on
Revenue and Taxation, "These limits tend to place a straightjacket on
local government and may cripple vitally needed services and preclude
expansion and improvement of socially desirable services. They result
in further demands by local government for state assistance."2 Declin-
ing assessment levels in California have been accompanied by rising
per capita expenditures. Low assessments have restricted taxes upon
land but the losses have been made up by State and local nonproperty
taxes, mainly the four per cent sales tax. The end result has been not
a reduction of expenditure but an increase, along with a shift of the
burden to less articulate taxpayers.
The Two Kinds of Victims
Undervaluation always has the effect and, we may suppose, the
aim of relatively lowering the taxes on some or all property in an
assessor's jurisdiction. Only in the very short run does the practice
reduce expenditure. Immediately, or soon, other taxpayers make up
the difference. But these other taxpayers who pick up the tab, these
victims of underassessment, consist of two distinct groups-roughly
speaking, property owners and nonproperty owners.
The undervaluation benefits enjoyed by property owners who pay
a statewide or intercounty property tax injure other property owners
who have to pay the same rate on a relatively higher assessed valu-
ation in other counties. The undervaluation benefits enjoyed by vet-
21 Taylor & Aull, Property Tax Problems in the Southeast, South Carolina Agricul-
tural Experiment Station of Clemson Agricultural College Bulletin 414, at 21 (Southeast
Regional Land Tenure Comm. Pub. No. 11, 1954).
22CAL. ASSEmLY INTEnml Comm. ON REVENUE AND TAXATION, TAXATION OF
PRoPERTY IN CALiFomNA 335 (1964). (Emphasis added.) See also F. Bmn, op. cit.
supra note 11, at 8.
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erans, like all exemptions, increase the taxes of other property owners
in the same jurisdiction, through the increased property tax rates they
necessitate. In either case, the tax shift is to other property owners.
But fractional assessments also shift taxes to nonproperty owners.
When an assessor's arbitrary undervaluation causes tax and debt limits
to strangle the fiscal powers of local governments and sends them to
Sacramento and Washington for aid, it is nonproperty owners who
pick up the tab in the form of higher sales and income taxes. This is
necessarily so because the State of California28 and the federal govern-
ment levy no tax upon property as such.24 When arbitrary under-
valuation by a county assessor shifts taxes to the State-assessed utili-
ties, it is again nonproperty owners who pick up the tab in the form
of higher rates for utility services. The shiftability of property taxes
on monopoly utilities is guaranteed by the Public Utilities Commis-
sion, which sets their rates.25 Those who look with satisfaction upon
the relative overassessment of utilities, who see in that practice the
restraint of "big corporate monopolies," are uninformed. Utilities are
not taxpayers, but tax collectors. Utility customers pay the tax.
The Disparity in Political Power
Any experienced legislator will testify that shifting taxes to prop-
erty owners and nonproperty owners are profoundly different under-
takings. Insofar as the victims of underassessment are other property
owners, they are political and economic peers of the beneficiaries and
have the capacity to fight back through their own assessor, the legisla-
ture, the Board of Equalization and the courts. That they do fight
back is shown by the perpetual concern over equalization. Most of
the cases cited by Justice Lillie were, as the Justice said, equalization
cases. 28 A recent report of the Commonwealth Club of California went
so far as to declare that "the problem of equalization is the essence of
23 With the exception of railroad cars not owned by railroad companies. CAL.
CONST. art. XIII, § 14.
24 The political and economic effects of taxes on the income from property differ
from the effects of taxes on property.
25 "Because taxes are a legitimate business expense, they, like all other legitimate
business expenses, are reflected in the rates (passed along to consumers). It is basic,
therefore, that the higher the taxes, the higher the rates, and conversely, the lower the
taxes, the lower the rates." Letter From C. Lyn Fox, President of the Public Utilities
Commission, to Glenn E. Coolidge, Chairman of the Joint Interim Committee on Assess-
ment Practices, Aug. 7, 1958, in JoINr INTEnRI COMMrs. ON AssFsMENT PaCTicEs,
FINAL REPORT TO THE CALIFORNIA LEGISLATURE 136 (1959).
26 Michels v. Watson, 229 A.C.A. 497, 508, 40 Cal. Rptr. 464, 470 (1964).
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the entire question of assessment practices."2 7 The veterans' exemption
too-indeed, all property tax exemptions-are under constant scrutiny
by politically powerful property owners who must make up the differ-
ence in their own tax bills.28 If underassessment did no more than
shift taxes from one property owner to another, such a wanton freak,
brazenly contemptuous of statutes and constitution, could not have
survived three-quarters of a century and won at last the implicit ap-
proval of our highest court.
The political strength of fractional assessments lies in their capacity
to shift taxes to nonproperty owners. The burden of sales and income
taxes and utility rates is diffused over such a large number of indi-
viduals, whose income sources require such constant attention and
diligence, that political organization on the basis of self-interest is
exceedingly difficult. By contrast, property owners, particularly the
holders of valuable central and peripheral land, are relatively small
in number and can well afford to defend their interests politically.
They are as an organized army against a mob.
The reports of legislative tax committees abound with concessions
to this difference. For example, the latest Assembly report calls it
"obviously unfair" and "completely unjustified" that, owing to differ-
ent assessment levels, "a [rapid transit] taxpayer in Contra Costa
County with property worth $100,000 would pay a tax on $23,400 of
assessed value while in San Francisco the pwner of property worth
$100,000 would pay a tax on $21,700... ."21 The report also complains
that fractional assessments "confuse and mislead the taxpayer"30 in his
endeavor to obtain equity. But as for the tax shift to utility customers
.caused by overassessment of utility property, a shift now on the order
of 150 million dollars a year,3' the report on the same page declares:
2 7 Kroeger, Assessment Practices: Report of Section on Governmental Finance, 56
TRANSACTIONS OF THE COMnMsONwFALT- CLUB OF CAL. 23, 26, published as 38 ThE
Co aC ONmvALTrH (PART 2) 23, 26 (1962).
28 The latest report of the Assembly Interim Committee on Revenue and Taxation
devotes 40 pages to property tax exemptions, CAL. ASsEMBLY INTmm Comnm. ON
REVENuE AN TAXATION, TAXATION OF ProPERTY IN CALIFORNIA 55-94 (1964). It rec-
ommends termination of veterans' exemption for all but disabled veterans, id. at 331.
29 Id. at 98.
30 Ibid. The taxpayer is ever the property taxpayer, another evidence of the differ-
ence being cited.
31 The State Controller's Annual Report of Assessed Valuation and Tax Rates of the
Counties of California for the Fiscal Year 1964-1965 reports county-assessed property,
net of exemptions, totalling $32,301,234,918 at an average ratio of 22.1% and State-
assessed utility property totalling $4,442,129,980. Richard Nevins, member of the Board
of Equalization, stated on November 13, 1963, that utility property is assessed "some-
what in the neighborhood of 42 percent." CAL. ASsEmBLY INTEim Commv. ON Rvmwn
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"An assessor is still wise to use low fractional assessment .... In
a county with low fractional assessment and a high tax rate, the utilities
will pay more taxes .... "32 The unmistakable meaning is that frac-
tional assessments, insofar as they injure property owners, are "un-
justified," but insofar as they injure nonproperty owners are "wise."
The difference shows again in the grudging compromise won
by the utilities about five years ago. Over a period of more than twenty
years, local assessors had dropped their assessment levels so far that
utilities were assessed by the State at about twice the level of county-
assessed property. 3 Instead of proposing compensation to utility
customers for the illegal burdens they had so long sustained, instead
of proposing even to stop the illegal practice, the Joint Interim Pro-
crustean Committee recommended that the law be changed to cor-
respond to the practice.34 "[T]he utilities," said the Committee, "pay
over twice as much in property taxes as other taxpayers for every
dollar of real or true market value.... [Yet... utilities are not as
oppressed as the above facts would indicate. . . . [T]he cost to the
utility enterprise represented by property taxes is passed on to the
consumer." 5 The utilities finally won an "agreement" that the Board
of Equalization would reduce the utilities' assessment level-but grad-
ually, so as to guarantee that property owners would retain their illegal
advantage over utility customers as long as possible, minimizing the
"disruption" of local finance always alleged to attend any restoration
of legal rights to nonproperty owners. Whether still lower local as-
sessments, commended as "wise" by the latest Assembly Interim
Committee," will maintain or worsen the discrepancy in levels remains
to be seen. 7
The same bias appears in the one-way attitude toward tax and
,ro TAXATroN, TAXATION OF PRoPEnTY iN CArLi~Omu 122 (1964). The present tax
bill of California utilities is $336 million. 1963-1964 CAL. STATE BD. OF EQUALIZATION
ANN. REP. 2. If county-assessed property were at the 42% ratio, it would total $61.4
billion and the total assessment roll would become $65.8 billion instead of the present
$36.7 billion. Utility taxes would become $336 million multiplied by 36.7/65.8, or
$187.5 million, a reduction of $148.5 million from the present figure.
32 CAL. AssEmBLY INTERim Com a. ON REvENUE AN TAxATION, TAXATION OF
PaoPERT' IN CALwOrB 98 (1964). (Emphasis added.)
33JoiNT IN mum Commvr. ON ASSESSMENT PRACTiCEs, FiNAL REPORT TO THE
CALIFoRNi& LEcisLATunE 12 (1959).
34 Id. at 15, 41.
35 Id. at 49.
36 Note 32 supra and accompanying text.
8 7 The discrepancy indicated in note 31 supra (42% to 22.1%) remains close to
double.
May, 1965] FRACTIONAL ASSESSMENTS
bond limits. That they will have to be tightened if assessment levels
are raised is taken for granted. 8 But were they relaxed as assessment
levels fell? They were not. Property owners were said to be paying
"all the tax they could stand" and local expenses were shifted to non-
property taxpayers through new and increased programs of state aid. 0
To tighten the limits when assessment levels rise is held to be an
act of simple statesmanship. To relax the limits when assessment levels
fall is unthinkable.
And who has not heard the dictum that equalization of assessments
is more important than the level of assessment? Does the dictum not
imply that the interests of property owners are more important than
the interests of nonproperty owners? Unequal assessments shift taxes
to other property owners. That is important. Low assessment levels
shift taxes to nonproperty owners. That, according to the dictum, is
less important.
Which Property Owners Benefit?
Although the underlying purpose of fractional assessments is to
limit property taxes, replacing them with sales taxes, income taxes and
indirect taxes on utility customers, not all property owners benefit
from this tax shift and not all property owners can be classified with
the interest that promotes it. Further refinement is needed to identify
the beneficiaries.
A property owner gains or loses money according to whether his
property tax saving is more or less than the new tax burdens he must
assume. For example, an apartment dweller whose personal property
is on the unsecured assessment roll is a property owner in the literal
sense, liable each year for a property tax. But only the most exceptional
tenant owns enough property to save in property tax as much as he
pays out in the taxes that replace it. One of the reasons advanced for
3 8 
"[Adjustments in tax rate limitations and bonding capacities would have to be
made by the Legislature if assessors were to make full-value assessments." CAL.
ASSEMBLY INrTEmt Comm. ON REVENUE AND TAXATION, TAXATION OF PROPERTY IN
CAL. FORNIA 99 (1964). See also id. at 141.
f 39 See McKay, A Constructive Program to Reduce Government Cost: In Criticism
of Certain Section Proposals, 49 TRANSACTIONS OF THE COMMONWEALTH CLUB OF CAL.
148, published as 31 THE COMMONWEALTH (PART 2) 148 (1955), where the author,
Assistant Executive Secretary, California Teachers' Association, says: "In 1946 the
people wrote into the Constitution a requirement that not less than $120 be allocated
for each unit of average daily attendance. At every legislative session thereafter, until
the Constitution was again amended in 1952, the Legislature not only reviewed that
expenditure but increased the amount. By 1951 the Legislature had increased the
amount to $147-$27 above the minimum set in the Constitution." Id. at 149.
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new nonproperty taxes, in fact, is that they extract more money from
those who own little property.
Most but not all homeowners are in the same position. The couple
with two or more children who occupy a modest home in a residential
neighborhood and have no other investment property share the tax
status of an apartment dweller. The sales taxes they pay on clothing
and household goods plus the tax increment in their gas, electricity,
and telephone bills exceeds the property tax savings these substitute
taxes bring them. They too are among the "owners of little property"
who carry more of the tax load when fractional assessments produce
a shift to nonproperty taxes.
In a different position, seemingly, are the owners of apartments
and hotels, of commercial and industrial buildings, and of the valuable
machinery, equipment, and inventories inside them. Here are large
amounts of taxable property that can benefit from the tax shift pro-
duced by fractional assessment. But great buildings and large in-
ventories also imply larger sales and income tax liabilities and higher
utility bills. More important, it is elementary economics that the
owners of buildings and their contents cannot keep long to themselves
the benefit of a property tax reduction that also reaches their actual
and potential competitors. Buildings, machinery, equipment, inven-
tories-all are reproducible. If fractional assessment raises the profits
that arise from such investments, capital flows in to share the higher
profits and by its competition drives the profits down.40 Untaxing such
reproducible wealth spills benefits in at least three directions: "back-
ward" to those who produce it, "forward" to those who consume it,
and "sideways" to those who hold land; land users are willing to pay
relatively higher rents because their use is not so heavily penalized in
areas where the tax relief is enjoyed. Whatever benefit 41 fractional
assessment of property brings to the owners of great buildings and
their contents is only temporary and tends to diffuse. Any attempt to
organize such investors to press for fractional assessment faces the
same hurdles that beset the political organization of nonproperty
owners: so many benefit, each by so little, and all are so busy.42 Owners
of reproducible property, like utilities, are largely tax collectors rather
40 See G. BAcE, EcoNo ics-AN INTRoDUCTION TO ANALYSIS AND PoLicy 612 (4th
ed. 1963).
41 But they also suffer, as will be shown, from the coincident untaxing of land.
42 Buildings, equipment, and inventories generally earn a higher rate of return than
the land where they stand, reflecting the greater management devoted to them by their
owners.
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than taxpayers. A tax policy that does unto others as to themselves
kindles public spirits but is hardly a sure-fire business proposition.
Who then are the property owners whose political support lies at
the root of the fractional assessment policy? If not apartment dwellers
or homeowners or the owners of great buildings or valuable equip-
ment or inventories, who does benefit from the shift to nonproperty
and utility taxes?
The clearest beneficiary is the speculator in idle land. Idle land
uses no gas, electricity, or telephone service. It supports no trade
subject to sales tax. It yields no taxable income. The property tax is
the only tax a land speculator pays while waiting for a rise. Thus he
can only gain from these substitute taxes-any substitute taxes43 -for
the only tax he pays. And if the land carries lower taxes, thus costing
less to hold, other investors see it as a better investment and are willing
to pay more for it.44
Unlike the owner of buildings and other reproducible wealth, the
investor in land need not fear that the tax relief which brings him
higher profit will also bring competitors to drive his profit down to
its old level. Granted that the same tax relief is enjoyed by competing
landholders and that their land too is worth more, the supply of land
is no greater. On the contrary,.the supply competing in the market is
less. 45 Tax relief, by facilitating the withholding of land, takes the
pressure off land speculators. Fewer are compelled by taxes to erect
"for sale" signs on their idle lots and acres.
Thus campaigns to relieve land of taxation are not handicapped by
diffusion of benefit. The gains, reflected in higher rents and sale prices,
are limited to those who hold land and must be paid for by all others.
Land tax relief through fractional assessment is therefore unexception-
able as a business 46 proposition for investors whose portfolios are rela-
43 Including capital gains taxes, which can be avoided by not selling.
44 
"Without a tax on property, the price of land would increase, perhaps signifi-
cantly." CAL. AssmmLy INTEiM Co m. oN RiEvENuE Amr TAXATioN, TAXAmTON oF
PoPmrT- iN CALiFORN 337 (1964). A first approximation of the increase would be
20 times the annual tax reduction-a 5% capitalization. This potential enhancement
of land prices by land tax relief is partly offset (with central sites probably fully offset)
by (1) the higher nonproperty taxes and utility rates which land users must weigh in
their bids, and (2) heightened speculation in land which robs downtown of its greatest
asset, density. See generally The Great Urban Tax Tangle, Fortune, March 1965, p. 106,
a 195.
45 The conclusion is not altered by filling a bay or erecting taller buildings, for
underwater sites and the sites on which tall buildings can be erected also share in the
tax relief, rise in price, and drift into speculative hands.
46 "Political proposition,' though less familiar, would be more precise. "Business"
retains a parity of meaning with busyness along productive lines and should not be
confused with the busyness of special interests in enhancing their privileges.
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tively heavy in land. They have much land to gain by, little else to
lose by.
Not all land speculators benefit, of course, from the tax shift.
Many have nonland interests through which they suffer more. The
ratio of land to nonland interests that marks the cut-off point is com-
monly underestimated. For the gain is direct, immediate and visible;
the injury so indirect, delayed and diffused that we respond to it as
did Mark Twain's contemporaries to the weather of which they all
complained. Sales taxes, utility bills, and taxes hidden in the things
we buy are a prodigious but unfelt drain day after day, month after
month. Property taxes, by contrast, strike twice a year, like the mea-
sured beat of a bass drum, keeping small homeowners awake and
ready to march to the protest meetings land speculators organize when
their assessor, often five years late, attempts to equalize their valu-
ations.
The Sources and Signs of Power
The restriction of benefit to a small circle who have relatively heavy
investments in idle and underused land is not, as might be supposed, a
political drawback. The fewer who share in the harvest, the easier it
is to round them up and collect seed money for candidates and cam-
paigns. The power of small, special interests to gain political ends
needs no illustration.
What the beneficiaries lack in numbers they make up in affluence.
For not only does affluence spring from successful land speculation
but the permanence of land, coupled with centuries of political success
in diverting taxes from it, gives land titles a reputation for security
that attracts the affluent The circle affected with a strong land
interest often includes the "leading families," whose grandparents or
great grandparents arrived early and acquired strategic land.
Moreover, the beneficiaries of fractional assessment need not and
naturally do not ask tax relief for land as such. As if in avoidance of
an Anglo-Saxon obscenity, the four-letter word becomes "real estate"
or "property." Relief is sought only for "homeowners" and "property
owners," for "golf courses" and "farms." A holding may run to six
or seven figures and rise by ten per cent a year, yet its holder will be
only an overtaxed, sunburned farmer who wants to follow the plow.
So prettily does the landed interest wear the mask of production48
47 Not to mention the deductibility of property taxes and the 25% limit on capital
gains tax, both of which drive speculative lands into the hands of investors in the upper-
income brackets.48 investments in reproducible tools and inventories are requisite to the existence
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that one might readily suppose the landed interest had all but van-
ished in modem society, where wealth takes other forms.
One evidence of the extent of speculative landholdings is the
12,876,000 vacant lots reported in the 1962 Census of Governments49
-enough already developed land (if not withheld at speculative
prices) to last the homebuilding industry thirteen years at present
construction rates. Speculative holdings lie most often on the fringes
of developing areas-the fringe of downtown, beside a proposed
transit station, near a new shopping center, at the city's edge. Any
location that promises rising values attracts speculators who hold for
a rise and block land use. Professor Gaffney has reported the immense
quantity of speculatively held land that fragments the San Francisco
Bay Area, giving us open space everywhere but where we want it:
Just how wide and how empty these territories are is startling
to discover. The New York engineering firm of Parsons, Brincker-
hoff, Hall & MacDonald surveyed land uses and potentialities in con-
nection with its 1953-1955 report to the San Francisco Bay Area
Rapid Transit Council. It found ample suitable acreage in the Bay
area for the entire projected 1990 population of the whole State of
California: 22 million to 31 million people-7 to 10 times the Bay
area's population of 3 million in 1953-1955. This is allowing ample
areas for recreation and industry.
The California State Water Resources Board surveyed the area
independently in 1955, using aerial photographs, and published the
findings in its Bulletin No. 2. For the 10-county Bay area metropolitan
region, only 15 percent of the suitable urban land, or 10 percent of
the gross land area, was actually developed for urban use in 1955.
In the crowded city of San Francisco itself, the Water Resources
Board survey showed 23 perceht of the usable land was undeveloped
in 1955. Along the Bay side of San Mateo County (the 'Peninsula"),
which is often hastily described as having become "a solid mass of
suburbs," 75 percent was undeveloped. On the Bay side of Alameda
County, which includes Oakland and Berkeley, the survey reported
62 percent was undeveloped.
In the Santa Clara Valley (around San Jose), whose "total urban-
ization" is often forecast as imminent, 86 percent of the suitable land
was undeveloped for urban use in 1955. The total suitable urban land
in this valley, 155 thousand acres net of streets, exceeds the area
used in 1955 in the entire Bay area (129 thousand acres, also net of
streets).50
of such capital and add to the economy's total productivity. Investments in land add
nothing to total output. See G. BAcH, op. cit. supra note 40, at 540.
49 U.S. Buanru OF = CENsus, CENsus OF COVMan.mNTS: 1962, VOL. II, TAxABIr
PaomTa VAYLruEs 7 (1963).
SO Gaffney, Urban Expansion-Will It Ever Stop?, in U.S. DEP'T. OF AGICuLTunE,
YnnmooE OF AcmcuvTruaE 503, 514-15 (1959).
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If the affluent few who hold these promised lands flex enough
political muscle to shift taxes to nonproperty owners through frac-
tional assessment, that power must reveal itself in other ways. Do
they perhaps shift their legal tax obligations to property owners too
-to those whose assets are less in land and more in buildings? Last
year the Statewide Homeowners Association surveyed 716 properties
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The figures show that holders of vacant land in California are
assessed less than one third as much in relation to market value as the
owners of residential or commercial property; the holders of low-
improvement land less than one half as much. The study found that
if the last two categories listed-such speculative holdings as Professor
Gaffney reported-were equalized with homes, an additional 812
million dollars a year would be available for financing local govern-
ments with no increase in tax rates.52
The unequal assessment levels in San Francisco and Contra Costa
County, which the Assembly Interim Committee called "completely
unjustified" in their effect upon transit taxpayers, 3 were in the ratio
of 1.078 to 1,14 a difference of less than eight per cent. The difference
in intracounty assessment levels found by the Homeowners Association
study was in the ratio of 3.64 to 1, or 364 per cent.
Why was the Assembly Committee disturbed over an eight per
cent discrepancy in intercounty level and untroubled over a much
greater intracounty spread? Could the crucial difference be that
among those injured by the eight per cent discrepancy are landed in-
terests powerful enough to elect and recall, while the same interests
only gain from the 364 per cent discrepancy in their favor? So far
from protesting the unconstitutional undervaluation of speculative
51 Statewide Homeowners Ass'n, Financing California's Public Schools by Property
Tax Equalization-A Nine County Survey, Feb. 1964, p. 26. (mimeo). See also CAL.
ASSEMBmY INTERIm Comm. ON REVENUE AND TAXATIoN, TAXATION OF PROPERTY IN
CALwonNA 135, table XII (1964).
52 Statewide Homeowners Ass'n, op. cit. supra note 51, at 26, 32.
53 Text accompanying note 29 supra.
54 Computed from figures in text accompanying note 29 supra.
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landholdings, the Committee devoted twenty pages15 to a sympa-
thetic review of the problems of "farmers" in the urban-rural fringe
and closed on the optimistic note that the State might give them the
money to pay their taxes.56
Future Dangers
It is a mistake to suppose that the landed interest will be satisfied
with one more tax favor. Taxes on utilities are almost twice the
average, yet assessors still are told it is "wise'" to assess low because
even more will be shifted to utility customers. Speculative lands are
assessed at one third or one fourth the average, yet "farmers" on the
city's edge demand further favors.
The landed interest is by nature implacable. The tax shift they
champion went all the way in England between 1660 and 1800. It
was advanced by a self-serving parliament in which only landholders
could sit and for which only landholders could vote.57 Throughout
Britain today every vacant lot is still tax exempt, and land specula-
tion reigns supreme. Most of Latin America is dominated by a landed
interest that pays little or no tax. Will this American republic be next?
It is past time to ask whether this implacable power does not
secretly strive for the total replacement of property taxes on land with
income and sales taxes that fall on productive enterprise. The tax
program currently offered by the Chairman of the Assembly Interim
Committee would eliminate twenty-five per cent of the property tax
for schools. Since schools use half the property tax revenue, this pro-
gram goes one-eighth of the remaining distance toward complete tax
exemption for California's landed interest. At least three times the
Committee report gratuitously introduced the suggestion that the
property tax might be swept away. So common is this mania for aboli-
tion that Nation's Cities in its March, 1955 issue entitled a special
tax report "Are Property Taxes Obsolete?"
While moving as expeditiously as possible toward replacement of
the only tax they pay, spokesmen for land speculators label those
who resist them as theorists and advocates of change.' 8 But they have
55 CAL. ASSmI3LY INEi COMM. ON REvENuE AND TAxATION, TAXATION OF
PaoPERTY rN CAIoFmRNA 204-24 (1964).
56Id. at 223-24.
57Land Speculation and Land Taxation Are Hot Political Issues in England Again
Today, House & Home, Aug. 1960, Land-A Special Issue, p. 129.
58 Speaking before the Commonwealth Club of California on February 19, 1965,
Jesse M. Unruh, Speaker of the California Assembly, said: "Three weeks ago, a tax
revision plan was released .... The most significant feature in the proposal is the $728
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a secret faith of their own, the theory of landlordism, that, directly or
indirectly, labor should pay all taxes, because privilege is the only
true property.59
million reduction in property taxes. . . .Our only opposition has come from county
assessors and the single-taxers.... Although the single-taxers profess to be for property
tax relief, I suspect they would like to see property taxes increase as long as land is
the only form of property subject to taxation. I am sure the people of this State would
prefer to see their property tax bills reduced substantially rather than to experiment
with nostrums which have been rejected five times by a statewide vote of the people.
However, these single-taxers have more front groups than the John Birch Society or
the Communist Party. They are afraid to come out and call themselves single-taxers so
they call themselves the 'California Homeowners' or 'The Incentive Taxation Com-
mittee' or some other pseudo title. I suspect that some are even here today-ready
to use your club as a vehicle, if possible."
59 See CAL. ASSEmmLY INTEHi Comm. ON REvENuE AND TAXATiON, CALiFoRNA's
TAX SmRucrunE: 1964, at 121 (1964), where this faith is implied in the familiar vested
rights argument referred to by Ronald Welch. The only reason wages cannot be capi-
talized into a vested right that taxation could impair is that their future existence is
uncertain. Wages require work.
